

Creation and Intention: Maimonides' Argument Revisited

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Abstract: Maimonides devoted particular attention to demonstrating what he termed the “possibility of the Torah.” In a world governed by necessary and universal laws, how can one account for the election of a specific prophet, place, time, or nation? By posing this question, Maimonides identified a fundamental issue in Jewish thought—one that also challenges any philosophical framework that affirms divine wisdom while seeking to accommodate distinctions between the sacred and the profane. He ties the very possibility of such distinctions to the metaphysical question of whether the world necessarily emanates from God or is instead the product of divine will. In a world devoid of intentionality, meaningful differentiation cannot be sustained. Several chapters in the second part of *The Guide of the Perplexed* are devoted to establishing that the world is not a necessary emanation from God. In this article, I argue that Maimonides' position acquires renewed significance in light of the discovery of symmetry violation in physics during the 1950s—a finding that profoundly unsettled the scientific community.

Key Words: Creation, Intention, Emanation, Parity, Spinoza, Maimonides, Reason, Will, Possibility of the Torah

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
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Leo Strauss taught that the Middle Ages offered a more moderate conception of rationality—one that avoids the radical rationalism of Spinoza and Hegel while still according reason a respected place. Maimonides is undoubtedly a prime example of this stance. Reason distinguishes human beings and endows them with dignity; nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge its limitations. Maimonides' thought, however, lends a distinctive dimension to this limitation of rationalism. In addition to reason, he introduces the elements of will and intention, which invite us to conceive of divine wisdom as discerning, choosing, and preferring. Reason is limited because the world is determined in ways that are, on the one hand, not arbitrary, yet on the other, not fully transparent to human understanding. In my reading, Maimonides viewed this idea as essential to what he called the "possibility of the Torah." If the world were necessitated by God and governed solely by universal principles, there would be no room for the Jewish religion—or indeed for any religion—that regards the distinction between the sacred and the profane as immanent to the world. Maimonides devoted several chapters in Part II of the Guide to arguing this point.

I will begin by presenting Maimonides' discussion in which he seeks to demonstrate that there is an element of will in creation. I will then show how developments in modern physics—more specifically, the surprising violation of left-right symmetry first proposed as a possibility by Tsung-Dao Lee and Chen-Ning Yang (1956) and confirmed by Chien-Shiung Wu (1957)—may serve to update this argument and reinforce it against later critiques, particularly that of Spinoza. At first glance, this dialogue between Maimonides' position and modern physics may seem unexpected; however, upon closer examination, it forms part of a broader and contemporary inquiry into the philosophical implications of the scientific revolutions of the twentieth century.

I . General Background

Maimonides' stated aim, at least on the surface, is to demonstrate to the perplexed person—one who has studied both Torah and philosophy—that these two domains are not inherently contradictory, as one might assume. In this respect, Maimonides differs from Saadia Gaon, whose goal was to guide his



readers toward true beliefs and to dispel their doubts, and from Judah Halevi, who—as the title of his work suggests—sought to defend Judaism against competing doctrines.

Maimonides' formulation of the problem leads him to pursue a combination of strategies. In the early chapters of the *Guide*, he illustrates how one must read the Torah with discernment and resolve confusions that may arise from literal interpretations, such as the assumption that God possesses corporeal form. Yet beyond these and similar exegetical aims, Maimonides also puts forward a variety of arguments to demonstrate the possibility of the Torah.

It is important to distinguish among these arguments according to the strength of their conclusions. One type of argument seeks to show that the philosopher has not succeeded in refuting religious belief. In Part II, Chapter 17, Maimonides presents such an argument. When Aristotle or another philosopher attempts to refute the possibility that the world was created anew, they typically assume that the principles valid within the fully formed cosmos must also have applied eternally—even during its initial coming-into-being. In response to this assumption, Maimonides offers a counterclaim:

No inference can be drawn in any respect from the nature of a thing after it has been generated, has attained its final state, and has achieved stability in its most perfect state, to the state of that thing while it moved toward being generated. ...The essential point is, as we have mentioned, that a being's state of perfection and completion furnishes no indication of the state of that being preceding its perfection. (*Guide* 2-17)

When we observe a living human being in the world, we are not entitled to conclude that the same conditions applied while he was still in his mother's womb. We know that he did not breathe independently, that he required a different mode of nourishment, and that extrapolating from his present condition to the moment of his formation is invalid. In light of this, Maimonides asserts—in Aristotelian terms—that one may not infer from the nature of a thing in actuality to its nature when it existed only in potentiality.

The specific details of the argument are not the focus of our discussion. What is significant is that, by means of this argument, Maimonides succeeds

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in nullifying any attempt to prove that the world is not created anew from principles that are taken from laws of nature that are true after the world was created:


You ought to memorize this notion. For it is a great wall that I have built around the Law, a wall that surrounds it warding off the stones of all those who project these missiles against it. (Ibid)

When Leo Strauss argues that the Enlightenment did not refute revelation—at least not without presupposing the very point at issue—he is in fact continuing this line of thought. Aristotle's proofs for the eternity of the world invariably assume that the laws currently in effect have always applied, from all eternity. This assumption may be of interest, but it does not undermine the position of one who maintains that the laws governing a thing in potentiality differ from those governing it in actuality. Thus, Aristotle's argument presupposes the very point it seeks to establish.

However, once we accept the claim that the creation of the world is not impossible, Maimonides proceeds along a well-known path and ultimately affirms the doctrine of creation—on the grounds that it guarantees the possibility of the Torah. The creation of the world is not necessary in order to prove the existence of a Creator—as was common among the *Mutakallimun*—but rather to support a claim which allows for the possibility of the Torah.

Maimonides assumes that creation entails that the world is the result of the divine will—an assumption of considerable weight to which I shall return later. The connection between the possibility of Torah and the doctrine of creation is articulated in the following known passage, from which I will quote at length:

Know that with a belief in the creation of the world in time, all the miracles become possible and the Law (Torah) becomes possible, and all questions that may be asked on this subject, vanish. Thus, it might be said: Why did God give prophetic revelation to this one and not to that? Why did God give this Law to this particular nation, and why did He not legislate to the others? Why did He legislate at this particular time, and why did He not legislate before it or after? Why did He impose these commandments and these prohibitions? Why did He privilege the prophet



with the miracles mentioned in relation to him and not with some others? What was God's aim in giving this Law? Why did He not, if such was His purpose, put the accomplishment of the commandments and the non-transgression of the prohibitions into our nature? If this were said, the answer to all these questions would be that it would be said: He wanted it this way; or His wisdom required it this way. And just as He brought the world into existence, having the form it has, when He wanted to, without our knowing His will with regard to this or in what respect there was wisdom in His particularizing the forms of the world and the time of its creation—in the same way we do not know His will or the exigency of His wisdom that caused all the matters, about which questions have been posed above, to be particularized. (Guide 2-25)

The paragraph is sufficiently clear, but it is worth expanding on it slightly. Once we accept the doctrine of creation, we are permitted to advance the claim that the world was created by divine will. This, in turn, allows us to defend the idea of divine preference. As I suggested above, Maimonides is concerned here with the metaphysical framework necessary to defend Judaism—but in fact, this applies to any religion that posits distinctions as the outcome of an objective order, rather than as the product of cultural convention or agreement.

Universal laws yield a homogeneous world and do not allow for differentiation or anomaly. The election of a nation is not merely a suspension of natural law, as one might think in the case of a miracle, but a manifestation of the deeper idea that God chooses to actualize certain possibilities that are not dictated by His infinite wisdom alone. Once we allow ourselves to attribute will to God, we can affirm that such an event is not merely contingent in the accidental sense, nor is it the product of universal laws—it testifies instead to divine intention.

Maimonides makes here an assumption which, to the best of my understanding, is not entirely transparent: namely, that if the world were necessary, we would be forced to confront questions for which we have no adequate answers—questions for which, in his words, there is no escape except through “unseemly answers”:

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
If, however, someone says that the world is as it is in virtue of necessity, it would be a necessary obligation to ask all those questions; and there would be no way out of them except through a recourse to unseemly answers in which there would be combined the giving the lie to, and the annulment of, all the external meanings of the Law with regard to which no intelligent man has any doubt that they are to be taken in their external meanings. (Ibid)

Maimonides does not compromise here and articulates a rather stark conclusion:

For if creation in time were demonstrated—if only as Plato understands creation—all the overhasty claims made to us on this point by the philosophers would become void. In the same way, if the philosophers would succeed in demonstrating eternity as Aristotle understands it, the Law (Torah) as a whole would become void, and a shift to other opinions would take place. I have thus explained to you that everything is bound up with this problem. Know this. (Guide 2-25)

It is worth returning here to the question of the relationship between the claim of the world's eternity and the claim of its necessity, or conversely, between the view that the world is created and the view that it is not necessary but rather brought into being by will. If we adopt the Platonic understanding of the eternity of the world—namely, that matter is eternal, but the world in its present form is not—then it is possible to maintain that the world is eternal and nevertheless created by will. In the passage I cited above, Maimonides does not offer a proof of the corresponding claim: that a created world necessarily indicates that it was created by will.

It may be possible to strengthen Maimonides' argument from other passages in the *Guide*, or by means of a more rigorous conceptual analysis of the doctrine of creation. What matters for our purposes is that Maimonides' principal—and perhaps only—use of the assumption of creation is that it enables the further claim that the world was created through will and intentionality. And yet, as we shall see below, Maimonides offers an argument in support of the claim that the world was created through deliberate intention without relying on the assumption that the world is temporally created at all.



Particularization and intentionality are semantically bound to the notion of possibility. Something that is possible could have been otherwise. In this respect, the idea of intention stands in opposition to necessity. However, Maimonides also emphasizes that mere contingency—randomness—is not equivalent to uniqueness or intentionality. We believe that there is some wisdom in the divine will, yet we do not know it, nor are we required to grasp it. Intentionality in creation means that the world is not necessary, and yet it is not arbitrary or meaningless. I shall return to this point later.

Framing the challenge of proving the possibility of the Torah as central to Jewish thought predates Spinoza's critique, which would emerge centuries later. In metaphysical terms, Spinoza argues that nothing in the world is contingent; everything follows from the divine nature with logical necessity. Preference implies the choice of one possibility over another equally coherent one, thereby undermining strict rationalism. The election of a particular people contradicts the principle of sufficient reason, which Spinoza, as a rationalist, held to be fundamental. According to this principle, the laws of nature are derived from God with the same necessity by which conclusions follow from axioms. These laws are universal, like reason itself, and therefore leave no room for preference. When something appears contingent to us, it is only because we lack knowledge of the underlying necessity. On this basis, Spinoza concludes that it was the Jews who chose God, not God who chose the Jews in preference to others.

Earlier, I referred to Maimonides' argument that exposes a tacit assumption in the claim of the world's eternity and thereby defends the possibility of creation. This is the argument that shows philosophy has not refuted the religious belief in a created world. The argument Maimonides presents, and which we shall examine below, advances further still: it aims to demonstrate the limitations of radical rationalism, without relying on the assumption of either eternity or creation. Reason, far from having discredited revelation—as Strauss argued—can, through its own internal resources, be shown to fail at sustaining its claim to universality.

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II . Refutation of the Claim that the World is Necessary

Maimonides does not content himself with merely rejecting Aristotle's arguments for the eternity or necessity of the world, as we saw in Chapter 17. He believes he can show—with a high degree of probability, though not with absolute proof—that the world is not necessarily emanated from God (*Guide* 2-19). His attempt to refute the thesis of necessity includes two arguments, which are interconnected but differ in emphasis. The first highlights observation, while the second is metaphysical in nature and is built on a principle concerning what flows from that which is simple.

A. The Argument from Sufficient Reason

The first argument is developed in *Guide* 2-19. Maimonides looks at the movements of the stars and remarks that it is unlikely there is a reason for every natural state. Prior to that, he established a principle:


In every case in which things differing in any way from one another possess a common matter, there must of necessity be a cause other than, and different from, the common matter—a cause that rendered it necessary that some of the things have a certain attribute, whereas some others have a different one. (Ibid)

After establishing this principle, we observe the diversity in the world and wonder about its source:

We put a question to Aristotle, saying to him: You have demonstrated to us that the matter of everything that is beneath the sphere of the moon is one and common to everything. What then is the cause of the differences between the individuals of every species? (Ibid)

Aristotle begins to lay out for us the principles of physics and the causes of the differences we observe:

Consequently, the differences in the compounds representing a mixture of the elements came about through the differing measures of the warm, the cold, the humid, and the dry. For in virtue of these various



combinations, various dispositions to receive various forms come about in the compounds. (Ibid)

Aristotle would be compelled to attribute these causes to more remote causes, until we arrive at the motions of the celestial spheres. But this merely raises the question of multiplicity and diversity in the world one level higher, and does not explain what we are trying to understand:

Now this task has not been accomplished by him, nor will it ever be accomplished. For he wished to give a cause for the fact that the sphere moves from the East and not from the West; and he wished to give a cause for the fact that some of them are swift of motion and others slow and that this is necessary because of the order of their position with regard to the highest sphere. (Ibid)

This argument proceeds from the observed multiplicity in phenomena and ascends to the source of these phenomena, reaching up to the celestial sphere. Multiplicity can be fully explained only by multiplicity; we thus lack a complete explanation for the observed multiplicity.

B. Simples Necessitates Simples

However, Guide 2-22, he presents a metaphysical argument for why it is unlikely that Aristotle could truly account for the multiplicity in the world of phenomena. A close study of the chapter is of great interest, yet it requires extensive analysis which I cannot fully offer here. I will only briefly comment on the general thrust of the argument, insofar as it allows for the formulation of a contemporary analogous argument. We begin with a metaphysical principle:

A proposition universally agreed upon, by Aristotle and by all those who have philosophized, reads as follows: It is impossible that anything but a single simple thing should proceed from a simple thing. If the thing is composite, there may proceed from it several things according to the number of simple things of which the compound is composed. Thus, for instance, what proceeds from fire, in which two qualities—heat and dryness—have combined is the action of heating by means of its heat and that of drying by means of its dryness. (Guide 2-22)

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
To this he adds other assumptions, of special interest is the following one:

Every agent, acting in virtue of purpose and will and not in virtue of its nature, accomplishes many different acts. (Ibid)

The basic idea is the following: when we are dealing with a simple entity, a great many things may contingently proceed from it; however, when the emanation is necessary, only that which is itself simple can proceed from the simple. This principle is extended also to things composed of several simple elements: two simple entities cannot necessarily produce something whose number of simple components exceeds three. Through this assumption—which concerns a qualitative conservation principle, namely simplicity—and through additional assumptions, Maimonides attempts to construct his argument. Let us note only that with the help of these assumptions, Maimonides argues that it is implausible for the world to have necessarily emanated from God, who, in Maimonides' view, is absolutely simple. Maimonides concludes:

How then can the composition have come to exist, the composition existing—as Aristotle believes—in the beings in virtue of necessity? We shall concede to him all that he says concerning a composition of various notions coming about in the intellects, as their intellecta are multiple, when the intellects get farther away from the First Cause. But even if we grant him this guess and conjecture, how can the intellects be a cause for the procession of the spheres from them? And what relation can there be between matter and that which being separate has no matter at all? (Ibid)

It is worthwhile to consider the overall structure of the arguments. In Chapter 19, he explains that Aristotle is in a strained position, having to provide a rational explanation for every fixed feature of reality. And in *Guide* 22, he attempts to show that such an explanation contradicts metaphysical principles, such as the rule that from the simple, only what is simple can necessarily proceed. What matters to us is not the argument itself, but the attempt to systematically block a response that would attribute the possibility we are raising here to ignorance or to lack of knowledge of the causes.



III. Asymmetry implies Intention

Maimonides' approach is significant in light of what is commonly referred to as the *epistemic question of modality*. When we know that something exists, we also know that it is possible. However, when something does not exist, we cannot decisively conclude that it is nevertheless possible. This problem can be rephrased: we may know that something is in fact true—but how can we know that it is not only true, but *necessarily* true, i.e., true in all possible worlds?

There is widespread agreement that logical truths are necessary in all possible worlds. The analytic philosopher Saul Kripke famously pointed to a class of *non-logical* truths that are nonetheless true in every possible world. The best-known example is: *water is H₂O*. While this statement does not possess the certainty of a logical truth, it carries the same ontological weight: if water is indeed H₂O, then it is necessarily so in all possible worlds. In other words, “water” that is not H₂O is simply not possible.

Kripke concludes *Naming and Necessity* with a fundamental question: are the laws of nature themselves necessary? Could there be a world in which the speed of light is different? In which the law of gravity is different? He leaves this question open for further discussion. The challenge is this: can one propose an alternative law of nature and defend it against the objection that what seems to be a possibility is merely the result of ignorance—our failure to fully comprehend the true laws of nature? Inspired by Maimonides' approach, I proposed a modern response in an article I published.

The scientific discovery at stake here was made possible by the work of three researchers. Two Chinese-American Nobel laureates, Tsung-Dao Lee and Chen-Ning Yang, raised a hypothesis in 1956 that was experimentally confirmed in 1957 by the physicist Chien-Shiung Wu, (who many believe was deserving of the Nobel Prize herself). It had long been assumed that the laws of nature do not distinguish between spatial locations: an experiment performed in one place will yield the same result if identically replicated elsewhere. Even subtler symmetries had been assumed: if a process occurs in nature, then so should its mirror image.

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Lee and Yang raised doubts about this assumption. While the symmetry could be demonstrated for electromagnetic forces, physics had also identified other forces—such as the weak nuclear force—and it was unclear whether the mirror symmetry held for them as well. They hypothesized that beta decay, which is governed by the weak force, might violate the symmetry between right and left. Wu confirmed this experimentally.


The discovery can be illustrated qualitatively as follows: suppose you arrive on a remote island and observe that every human being there has their heart on the left side. Imagine this island is your entire world. You can conceive, without difficulty, of a world in which the human heart is located on the right side. The fact that on this island every person has a heart on the left constitutes a *natural law*. As you study this law, you come to understand its cause: parents with left-sided hearts pass on this trait to their offspring. Ultimately, this could be linked to some primordial molecular preference for left-handed over right-handed structures.

Molecules, after all, can be composed of the same atoms and yet differ in spatial configuration—just as right-handed and left-handed gloves are mirror images. When I see a molecule shaped like a right-handed glove, I naturally entertain the possibility that a mirror-image, left-handed version exists. If someone were to respond that this is merely a product of ignorance—and that deeper inquiry would reveal that only one such molecular form is possible—this would seem overly forced.

A comparison may clarify the issue. Suppose you state that the boiling point of water at a specific pressure is 100°C, and you speculate that, under identical conditions, it could have been 80°C. A strict rationalist might reply: study the nature of the electrical forces between molecules, and you will understand that a specific amount of energy is required to separate them and induce boiling. In this case, you would discover that a different boiling point is in fact impossible.

But this kind of argument, when applied to the possibility of right-sided hearts, is problematic. If there were a rational impediment to having hearts on the right, then this same problem should arise with hearts on the left. And yet, people with left-sided hearts clearly exist.

The use of the distinction between right-handed and left-handed gloves to



support a metaphysical claim is not new. Immanuel Kant employed this very example to refute Leibniz's rationalist conception of space and time. For Kant, if space were merely a conceptual construct, there would be no meaningful distinction between right-handed and left-handed gloves. The fact that *wecan* distinguish between them shows, in his view, that space is an *intuition* (*Anschauung*), not a mere concept. This connects to the limitations of reason, which I alluded to earlier in reference to Leo Strauss. According to Kant, the strength of reason lies in ethics; in natural science, however, he distinguishes fundamentally between intuitions and concepts—thereby limiting the reach of reason and offering a rational justification for that limitation.

Nevertheless, the difference between Kant and Maimonides should be sharpened. Kant draws upon the asymmetry between right and left gloves to argue that space is an intuition and not entirely conceptual. There is, therefore, something in space that lacks the necessity associated with pure concepts. If space were a purely rational concept, we would not discern any distinction between left and right. However, Kant's argument involves no divine will or intention, as Maimonides seeks to suggest. The very preference for one glove over another reveals that the world is not necessary in all respects—a stance that could be maintained if space were entirely conceptual. Later we will see that this also implies the existence of time, which, according to Kant, is a pure intuition. This might suggest that time is a product of divine intention. The difference between Kant and Maimonides runs deep into Kant's critique of rationalism.

The scientific community was stunned by this discovery. Wolfgang Pauli, one of the key contributors to the understanding of the weak force, wrote to psychologist Carl Jung that he could not imagine that God was left-handed. This was a paraphrase of Einstein's famous dictum: "God does not play dice," which, in its own way, relates to our present discussion. Pauli's remark touches on Maimonides' central intuition: religious thought cannot accept a wholly homogeneous world. Just as it distinguishes between weekdays and Sabbaths, sacred and profane spaces, so too must it distinguish between prophets and nations.

Maimonides saw in science and philosophy a challenge not only to Judaism, but to religious thinking in general. This challenge was not exacerbated by the Copernican revolution, which produced a homogeneous and symmetrical univ-

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erse. The discovery made by the three scientists shifted the scientific picture by demonstrating a fundamental point: *a world with different laws of nature is indeed possible*. Einstein's vision, which he expressed in theological terms—that God had no choice in creating the world—was thereby undermined, or at least placed in doubt.


We have here rebutted those who, like Spinoza, claim that everything is necessary, and that any assertion of possibility reflects ignorance. The case discussed above, which I explored in depth in my article, and where I addressed possible counterarguments, is strong enough to show that Spinoza's claim is dogmatic. From the fact that in some cases what appears possible turns out upon deeper investigation to be impossible, it does not follow that this is *always* the case. This metaphysical assumption has been challenged by 20th-century discoveries in physics.

IV. Implications

Readers may now ask: beyond drawing an analogy to Maimonides in order to limit rationalism, can we deepen the meaning of this result? Indeed, we have succeeded in demonstrating that nature exhibits preferences—contrary to Spinoza's homogeneous conception of nature, which, according to Maimonides, undermines the legitimacy of differentiation, a notion central to religious worldviews.

If nature expresses preferences through symmetry violations, then one cannot rule out *a priori* divine preference—say, for one prophet or one nation to receive the Torah. A clarification is in order: the mere fact of preferring one nation over another marks a departure from the understanding of universality in terms of homogeneity. One could take this further: The uniqueness of a chosen prophet does not negate the uniqueness of every individual, each created in God's singular image. Similarly, the fact that one nation was chosen for a particular reason does not contradict the possibility that every nation and every religion has its own unique destiny within the broader plan that God has designed for humanity.

Still, we seek to understand the religious meaning of the existence of alternative possibilities. Here too, Maimonides helps us, particularly in his development of the concept of intention. Intention is distinct from blind



necessity, but equally distinct from arbitrary, random possibility. A world governed by capricious chance is a world that cannot be the subject of scientific inquiry. Maimonides rejected the view—attributed to Aristotle—that everything is necessary, just as he rejected the anti-scientific view of the Mutakallimūn, who posited pure contingency.

The case of right-left asymmetry discovered by Wu relates to powerful symmetry principles—such as time symmetry and charge-conjugation symmetry—known collectively in the literature as *CPT symmetry*. This is not the place to elaborate, but suffice it to say: the relatively minor asymmetry between right and left makes possible the far more significant asymmetry in time, without which the universe could not persist long enough for complex matter, life, and human beings to emerge. In other words, the asymmetry we have observed enables life. And when we are presented with a contingent, non-necessary world that nonetheless allows for a desirable end—life itself—then it is reasonable to speak of *intention*.

With this remark, we are confronted with a question that we have not yet addressed in our analysis of Maimonides’ strategy for avoiding the view that the world and its characteristics proceed from God by necessity. In his discussion, Maimonides presents creation by intention as a position that necessarily entails a limitation of human reason. This is a strong assumption, and it is not clear that it has been sufficiently justified. For it is one thing to argue that the world is the product of God’s intention, and quite another to assert that we lack access to the wisdom that guided Him in creating it—a wisdom that Maimonides, notably, does not deny in his discussions of divine will. What we can hold with confidence is that if the world is the result of God’s will, we *may* never fully fathom the reasons that guided Him in His decisions. This may suffice to meet the theological need of securing a place for the Torah. However, the claim that the world is the result of divine intention does not necessarily imply that we will never have access to the wisdom that guided God in creating it. We arrived at this assumption toward the end of the essay, and it deserves a thorough examination that I am unable to offer here.

From the moment we have one argument indicating intention, the question arises whether there are additional arguments. This question leads us to contemporary discussions in physics such as the anthropic principle,

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principles of least action, and others. Maimonides sought to demonstrate that it is not impossible for there to be intention in creation, and in order to refute the a priori argument against the possibility of the Torah, this is sufficient. However, to advance in this direction, Maimonides must show not only that preference is not impossible, but that this preference is indeed fitting and is not problematic from other perspectives. At this point, it is relevant to recall Maimonides' admiration for the wisdom of the commandments of the Torah. In truth, this preference is not contrary to universality, since it conceives itself as a way to actualize the message of the sanctity of life, human dignity, and liberty throughout the entire world. In this conception, the Torah and the commandments are tools in the education of all humankind—a toolbox for the repair of the world.

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
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